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The paper aims to examine the role of institutions and human development in ﬁnancial
development at early and developing stages of economic development, using data from
52 developing economies during 1985–2008. In order to provide a more comprehen-
sive assessment, especially of the ﬁnance-institutions link, we decompose institutions
into economic, political and social; and economic institutions into quality of govern-
ment, intervention of government, and quality of the legal system. The results demon-
strate that: (i) institutional quality can explain international differences in the level of
banking sector development; (ii) economic institutions and human development are
extremely signiﬁcant for banking sector development; (iii) the legal system is the dom-
inant dimension of economic institutions; and (iv) the combined reforms of economic
institutions matter more than separate institutional reforms.
Keywords: banking sector development; institutions; trade openness; human
development; ﬁnancial openness; panel data analysis
JEL Classiﬁcation: G29; F19; K49
1. Introduction
Since Schumpeter (1911), economists have been debating the role of the ﬁnancial sector
in the process of economic development. Although the channels and even the direction of
causality have not been fully clariﬁed, the argument that ﬁnancial institutions might max-
imise economic growth is supported empirically by many researches in the ﬁnancial
development literature, from cross-country comparisons (King & Levine, 1993; Levine &
Zervos, 1998), industry level studies (Rajan & Zingales, 1998), time-series research
(Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000), and panel data analysis (Apergis, Filippidis, & Economidou,
2007).
Recently, the ﬁnance-growth literature has focused on the ﬁnancial development
policies issues, namely the sources of ﬁnancial development. Apart from the traditional
mechanisms that impact on ﬁnancial development, such as capital account openness
(Chinn & Ito, 2002), trade openness (Do & Levchenko, 2004), political decisions (Rajan
& Zingales, 2003) and macroeconomic factors such as the level of inﬂation (Boyd,
Levine, & Smith, 2001), there has been a growing emphasis on the institutional factors
in the literature. A country’s economic and political institutions, formed by a country’s
legal origin (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) or by a country’s initial endowment
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(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, 2002), affects both creditor rights and private
credit, and the extent of creditor rights protection has an independent effect on ﬁnancial
sector development.
With regard to this outline, we try to provide a more comprehensive assessment,
especially of the ﬁnance-institutions link, by asking two interesting questions: ﬁrst,
which dimension of institutions (economic, political or social) matters more for ﬁnancial
development? It is important to distinguish between these dimensions since they have
different initial hypotheses and different structural characteristics: political institutions
include the type of government and the level of democracy; economic institutions
include the presence and quality of markets and the regulatory structures; ﬁnally, social
institutions include the social norms and practices.
Second, are there any structural components of economic institutions that impact
more on ﬁnancial development? In other words, is it the ‘law and ﬁnance’ theory by La
Porta et al. (1997) – where countries have different institutions due to different law
structures – or the ‘settler mortality’ hypothesis by Acemoglu et al. (2001) – where
countries have different institutions due to different initial functioning of the economic/
political system – that better explains institutional differences across countries?
Although signiﬁcant research tried to test these theories in the past, by separately testing
on legal origin or settler mortality variables, new tools provide better measures of legal
institutions and government efﬁciency, thus a more precise view of their causal
relations.
Finally, we include the effect of human development, that enables us to comprehend
in a upper level the determinants of the ﬁnancial – and particularly the banking – sys-
tem. Human development represents a broader concept than the GDP per capita variable
that has been a common practice in the literature as a standard measure of development,
since it measures the average achievements in three basic dimensions of a country’s
development: health, knowledge and development (GDP per capita).
To investigate these extensions of the literature, we employ dynamic panel tech-
niques that allow us to avoid the known problems of heterogeneity and endogeneity of
the traditional techniques and study the dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi, 2008). An
underlying advantage of the dynamic GMM estimation is that all variables from the
regression that are not correlated with the error term (including lagged and differenced
variables) can be potentially used as valid instruments (Greene, 2008). More speciﬁcally,
we employ the two-step System-GMM estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995), and
Blundell and Bond (1998) that generally produces more efﬁcient and precise estimates
compared with Differenced GMM by improving precision and reducing the ﬁnite sam-
ple bias (Baltagi, 2008).
From the empirical results, we argue that economic institutions are of fundamental
importance for banking sector development, while political institutions are statistically
signiﬁcant at lower levels of economic development; regarding the economic institu-
tional dimensions, the legal system is the dominant dimension of economic institutions;
and the combined reforms of economic institutions matter more than separate institu-
tional reforms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, there is a brief
presentation of the related ﬁnancial development literature; Section 3 describes the vari-
ables and the methodology used; in Section 4 we present the empirical results; and the
ﬁnal section provides a summary and relative conclusions.
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2. Brief review of the literature
There are a great many exogenous and endogenous factors that can explain the
differences between ﬁnancial developments among different countries. For simplicity,
we can summarise these factors into four categories: liberalisation in the goods and cap-
ital markets; institutional reforms; political choices; and macroeconomic stabilisation.
First, liberalisation policy whether in the ﬁnancial market or the goods market has a
positive effect on ﬁnancial development. Increased volume of trade may act as a propel-
lant for the ﬁnancial sector to grow, since trade openness by increasing the efﬁciency of
technology (through knowledge spillovers) might increase the payoff to the ﬁnancing
young entrepreneurs, fostering the formation of active capital markets. On the other
hand, freeing the ﬁnancial system from government intervention allows a more efﬁcient
allocation of resources by various economic agents.
Using a panel of 24 countries, Rajan and Zingales (2003), establish that a combina-
tion of trade and account openness is prime for ﬁnancial development, especially when
cross-border capital ﬂows are free. Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2009) verify the
hypothesis of Rajan and Zingales (2003) from a bank sector development view. Their
ﬁndings suggest that both ﬁnancial openness and trade openness can independently lead
to ﬁnancial development. Similarly, Pham (2010) shows the existence of bi-directional
causality between openness (trade and ﬁnancial) and ﬁnancial development. The open-
ing of goods and service markets seems to be a precondition for ﬁnancial development/
openness; in turn, both ﬁnancial development and ﬁnancial openness encourage trade
openness. From a long-run perspective, recently Kim, Lin, and Suen (2010), using a
Pooled Mean Group on 88 countries with data spanning from 1960 to 2005, established
a positive long-run link between trade openness and ﬁnancial development. They,
however, stressed the coexistence of negative short run coefﬁcients.
Second, institutional quality is likely to affect ﬁnancial development through the
ability of the ﬁnancial sector to channel resources to ﬁnance productive activities. In the
absence of an adequate regulatory framework and supervision, the ability of ﬁnancial
markets to mobilise funds may be strongly undermined by a lack of depositors’ conﬁ-
dence. This will cause funds to drift abroad and generally away from viable domestic
investment opportunities. More broadly, well-deﬁned rules and their smooth enforce-
ment, i.e. better institutional quality, greatly reduce the transaction costs economic
agents face and thus lead to more efﬁcient outcomes (North, 1990, 1991).
Either under the scope of the ‘law and ﬁnance’ theory (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998)
or the ‘settler mortality’ view (Acemoglu et al., 2001), the ﬁnancial development litera-
ture provides evidence of the relative importance of both hypotheses. The quality of
institutions is likely to affect ﬁnancial development through the ability of the ﬁnancial
sector to channel resources to ﬁnance productive activities (Chinn & Ito, 2002; Baltagi
et al., 2009; Law & Azman-Saini, 2008; Hooshmand, Hosseini, & Moghani, 2013).
More speciﬁcally, Law and Azman-Saini (2008) show that institutional quality has a
major inﬂuence on ﬁnancial development, especially on the development of the banking
sector. On the other hand, the development of the stock market does not seem to be
inﬂuenced by institutions. Finally, the relationship between institutions and ﬁnancial
development seems to have the U form. In other words, the institutional framework
affects the ﬁnancial development only when the country has reached a certain level of
institutional quality, a condition that occurs more in low-income countries.
The recent surveys of Law and Habibullah (2009), Huang (2010) and Ayadi, Arbak,
Naceur, and De Groen (2013) also conﬁrm the important role of institutions on ﬁnancial
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development. More speciﬁcally, using a sample of panel data for 90 countries for the
period 1990–1999, Huang (2010) showed that the institutions-ﬁnance relationship is
particularly strong in those countries with low incomes, ethnic inequalities and with a
legal framework based on French law. Law and Habibullah (2009), using a dynamic
panel model in a sample of 27 countries for the period 1980 to 2001, concluded that
the quality of institutions is a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of ﬁnancial develop-
ment, regardless if it is the banking sector or the stock market. Finally, Ayadi et al.
(2013) using a sample of both northern and southern Mediterranean countries for the
years 1985 to 2009, show that strong legal institutions, good democratic governance
and adequate implementation of ﬁnancial reforms can have a substantial positive impact
on ﬁnancial development only when they are present collectively.
Another way of looking at the divergent performance of countries is to look at the
political system in which decisions about economic policies are made. Financial
underdevelopment may be a deliberate policy choice by incumbents who shape policies
and institutions in order to stay in power and enrich themselves (‘politics and ﬁnance’
view).1 Established military / industrial elite may be advantaged in a system in which
entry of new ﬁrms is restricted through limited access to ﬁnancial capital by outsiders
(Girma & Shortland, 2008; Haber & Perotti, 2008).
A ﬁrst test of a political economy model of ﬁnancial development was undertaken
by Rajan and Zingales (2003). Their paper tests the hypothesis that political systems
governed by narrow elites obstruct the development of the ﬁnancial system. High inter-
national capital mobility and a high degree of trade openness are connected with higher
levels of ﬁnancial development, since capital mobility and open trade undermine both
the ability and the incentive of incumbents to suppress domestic ﬁnancial development.
They show that the interaction term between trade openness and international capital
mobility has had a signiﬁcant and positive effect on ﬁnancial development over the
twentieth century.
The last group of factors of ﬁnancial development is macroeconomic conditions and
particularly inﬂation, which has a negative implication on ﬁnancial development perfor-
mance (Boyd et al., 2001). Recent theories demonstrate how increases in the rate of
inﬂation have negative repercussions for ﬁnancial sector performance. The common
departure of these theories is that there are informational asymmetries in credit markets.
As inﬂation increases, the real rate of return on money falls, credit market frictions are
getting worse and credit rationing becomes more severe. As a result, the ﬁnancial sector
makes fewer loans, resource allocation is less efﬁcient, and intermediary activity dimin-
ishes with adverse implications for capital investment.
3. Variables and methodology
3.1. Variables
The objective of this study is to examine the variables that may affect the ﬁnancial
development. In order to reach the full effect of the institutional change in the ﬁnancial
development, the model is estimated for the period 1985–2008 for 52 low, lower-middle
and upper-middle economies. The diversiﬁcation of work is that it seeks to address the
three dimensions of the institutions (political, economic and social) and the possible
effects of different aspects of economic institutions.
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3.1.1. Financial development
There is a large amount of literature discussing the possible measures of ﬁnancial
development. For measuring banking sector development, the most popular measure is
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (LL). Other standard measures are the ratio to GDP
of credit issued to the private sector by banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries (PC)
and the ratio of the commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank assets and
central bank assets (DBA). Following Huang and Temple (2005), our measure is based
on the combined effect of LL, PC and DBA, which captures the complete extent of
bank-based intermediation (BSD).2
3.1.2. Institutions
In order to provide a more comprehensive assessment, especially of the ﬁnance-institu-
tions link, we decompose institutions into economic, political and social; and economic
institutions into quality of government, intervention of government, and quality of the
legal system. As such, the economic institutional quality is proxied by: (a) the quality
of government (approached by the indicators of bureaucracy, corruption, legislative
capacity and accountability of the government), in order to approach the ‘settler
mortality’ hypothesis; (b) the quality of the legal system, in order to proxy the ‘law and
ﬁnance’ view; and (c) the intervention of government, in order to proxy the ‘politics
and ﬁnance’ view. We conduct our analysis using a general index and the three individ-
ual components with all possible combinations.
Following Haber and Perotti (2008), who suggested that a political system with
more democratic accountability on the part of policy designers can achieve a higher
level of ﬁnancial development, we employ the Polity index,3 in order to proxy the polit-
ical institutional quality. The Polity variable was designed to record the regime’s institu-
tionalised authority characteristics. The database records a democracy score and an
autocracy score (ranging from 0 to 10), and subtracting the autocracy score from the
democracy score of a country creates the polity2 variable. Higher scores of polity2
therefore indicate a higher degree of democracy. In the present study we use DURABLE
from the Polity index, which is a measure of the durability of the regime’s authority pat-
tern for a given year. It shows the number of years that have passed since the last major
change in the authority characteristics. This change can be either towards democracy or
autocracy.
Finally, following Basu (2008), we use the Workers’ Rights Index from CIRI
Human Rights Dataset,4 as a proxy for social institutional quality. This index indicates
the extent to which workers’ rights at work are internationally recognised, including a
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour; a minimum age for
the employment of children; and acceptable conditions of work with respect to
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
3.1.3. Trade openness
Trade openness is measured as the volume of exports and imports to GDP:
TO = (IMP + EXP) / GDP
where IMP (EXP) denotes the sum of imports (exports) of goods and services.
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3.1.4. Financial openness
Financial openness is measured using the data on foreign assets and liabilities from
international investment positions published by central banks. We use the ratio of accu-
mulating holdings of assets and liabilities of portfolio equity and ﬁnancial derivatives to
GDP:
FO = (PORTA + PORTL + FDA + FDL) / GDP, where PORTA (PORTL)
denotes the stock of portfolio equity assets (liabilities) and FDA (FDL) the stock of
ﬁnancial derivatives assets (liabilities).
3.1.5. Macroeconomic variables
(a) Inﬂation, aimed at capturing the consistency of monetary policy; and (b) Human
Development Index (HDI), which is a composite index that measures the aver-
age achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development:
a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as
measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for
primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as mea-
sured by GDP per capita. It is obvious that HDI represents a broader concept
than the GDP per capita variable that has been common practice in the literature
as a standard measure of a country’s development.
3.2. Methodology
To assess the role of institutions and human development in ﬁnancial development for
52 developing economies during 1985–2008, the following model is estimated:
yit ¼ ayi;t1 þ x0it2bþ eit
eit ¼ li þ vit
E½li ¼ E½vit ¼ E½livit ¼ 0
(1)
where yit is banking sector development, xit is a vector of variables including institutions
(ECONOMIC, REGIME, WORKERS), trade openness (TO), ﬁnancial openness (FO),
inﬂation (INFL) and human development indicator (HDI);5 the disturbance term has two
orthogonal components: the ﬁxed effects, μi and idiosyncratic shocks, vit; the subscripts
i and t represent country and time period. According to the ﬁnancial development litera-
ture, we expect the sign of the coefﬁcient of institutions, openness and human develop-
ment index to be positive and the sign of the coefﬁcient of inﬂation to be negative.
In order to remove the ﬁxed effect, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) difference the equa-
tion and use yi,t-2 as an instrument for Δyi,t-1 (to avoid the correlation with the error
term). Going a step further, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the Differenced GMM
estimator for dynamic panel data models, which uses all lagged values of y and x as
instruments for Δyi,t-1 and Δxi,t-1 in the ﬁrst-difference equation of Anderson and Hsiao
(1981). The result is an instrument matrix Z that is of the form:
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Zi ¼
½yi1; x0i1; x0i2 0    0
0 . .












This matrix corresponds to the family of (T – 2)(T – 1)/2 moment conditions:
E½yi;t1Deit ¼ 0 for each t 3; l 2 (3)
The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments Arellano-Bond by making an
additional assumption, that ﬁrst differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with
the ﬁxed effects. This allows the introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically
improve efﬁciency. It builds a system of two equations – the original equation as well
as the transformed one – and is known as System GMM. In other words, a ‘system
GMM’ estimator enables the lagged ﬁrst-differences of the series (yit, xit) dated t–1 to
be used as instruments for the untransformed equations in levels. Τhe typical instrument
set looks like:
ZLi ¼
½Dyi2;Dx0i2;Dx0i3 0    0
0 . .












This corresponds to the moment conditions:
E½Dyi;t1eit ¼ 0 for each t 3 (5)
Based on the combination of ﬁrst-difference equations with suitably lagged levels as
instruments, and levels equations with suitably lagged ﬁrst-differences as instruments,
the system GMM estimator generally produces more efﬁcient and precise estimates
compared with ﬁrst-differenced GMM by improving precision and reducing the ﬁnite
sample bias (Baltagi, 2008). Three points are worth mentioning about system GMM
(Roodman, 2006, 2007): (i) the GMM estimator requires that there is ﬁrst-order serial
correlation but that there is no second-order serial correlation in the residuals. Since the
null hypotheses are that there is no ﬁrst-order/second-order serial correlation, it means
that one needs to reject the null hypothesis in the AR(1) test but not to reject it in the
AR(2) test to get appropriate diagnostics; (ii) the system GMM can generate an enor-
mous number of potentially ‘weak’ instruments that can cause biased estimates. There-
fore, we have to check that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of
observations.6 Second, we have to check the Hansen statistic, which tests the null
hypothesis of correct model speciﬁcation and valid overidentifying restrictions, i.e.
validity of instruments. The p-value of this statistic should have a higher value than the
conventional 0.050 or 0.100 levels, in order to accept the null hypothesis that the model
has the correct speciﬁcation and valid instrumentation; and (iii) the ‘steady state’
assumption requires a kind of steady-state in the sense that deviations from long-term
values are not systematically related to the ﬁxed effects. More simply, the estimated
coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent variable in the model should indicate convergence
by having a value less than unity, otherwise system GMM is invalid.
As we can see from the tables that follow, all rules are satisﬁed and the speciﬁcation
tests – the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation and the Hansen test of valid
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overidentifying restrictions – that are reported in the last rows of each column, support
the validity of the model speciﬁcation and instrumentation.
4. Results
Table 1 reports the regression results from the two-step system-GMM for the period
1985–2008 for low- and lower-middle-income countries. The dependent variable is
Banking Sector Development and the explanatory variables are: Economic, Political and
Social Institutions, Financial Openness, Trade Openness, Inﬂation and Human Develop-
ment Index. In models 1–3 we estimate the three different dimensions of economic
institutions (quality of government, quality of the legal system, and intervention of gov-
ernment) and in models 4–6 we estimate the combinations of the three dimensions of
economic institutions. In model 7 we estimate overall economic institutions. In Table 2,
we present the regression results for all developing countries.7
4.1. Low and lower-middle income countries
When low and lower-middle income countries are examined, economic institutions in
all dimensions (and combinations) are statistically signiﬁcant, with the dimension of
legal structure to be displayed as the most important, at a rate close to 0.0395 (model
2). As shown in models 4 and 5, the combinations of legal structure with government
intervention and government quality have large and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
(0.0449 and 0.0479, respectively), emphasising the primacy of good government struc-
tures in low levels of economic development, especially if government policy and
rationale is based on a stable legal structure (integrity of the legal system, judicial inde-
pendence, protection of property rights, legal enforcement of contracts, etc). In other
words, the legal dimension of economic institutions is of fundamental importance for
banking sector development, and much more when it is accompanied by a less govern-
ment intervention via privatisation or/and liberalisation of the public sector and by a
government commitment against bureaucracy and corruption.
Regarding the political institutions, regime durability is highly signiﬁcant in all spec-
iﬁcations of the regressions for low and lower-middle income countries, with a coefﬁ-
cient ranging from 0.0003 (model 3) to 0.0004 (model 4). This result is consistent with
the political economy and the economic logic, since more developing and democratic
societies lessen the power exercised by the elite, and consequently leads to more active
ﬁnancial markets. As for the social institutions, there is a particularly important result
from this analysis: although insigniﬁcant in all cases, labour rights (minimum wage, job
security) exhibit a positive coefﬁcient (in all speciﬁcations for low and lower-middle
income countries), a compatible result with the theory of effective wages. Wages and
labour rights appear to have marginally positive economic beneﬁts, since job security
motivates employees to plan long-term economic action, i.e. to save, invest and borrow
to a greater extent than in an unstable working environment.
Moreover, openness (in goods and capital market) also have statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients in all models (trade openness exhibits an average coefﬁcient of 0.0045 and
ﬁnancial openness an average coefﬁcient of 0.0861) since, as supported by the literature,
openness fosters the formation of active ﬁnancial markets by increasing the efﬁciency of
technology (through knowledge spillovers), by diversiﬁcation of risk, and by expanding
ﬁnancially intensive sectors. Finally, note that HDI exhibits statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients in all speciﬁcations, a result absolutely consistent with the ﬁnancial
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development – economic growth relationship. The values of human development are
very high (up to 0.0830, model 2), demonstrating the paramount importance of
economic development for the development of ﬁnancial markets for lower-middle
countries. In sum, as shown in model 7, ﬁnancial openness is considered as the main
determinant of the banking sector development (0.0972), followed by HDI (0.0729),
economic institutions (0.0538) and inﬂation (–0.0004).
4.2. All developing countries
In all countries’ analysis, the results are (more or less) the same: economic institutions
are statistically signiﬁcant, with the dimension of legal structure (0.0362, model 2) and
its combination with the other two dimensions exhibiting the largest values (0.0490 and
0.0497, models 4 and 5). This apparently shows that a government rationale is a precon-
dition for developing countries: ﬁrst, bureaucracy and corruption distort the economic
and ﬁnancial environment by forcing the withdrawal or withholding of an investment
and encourage the development of the black market; second, the degree of liberalism of
the state and the extent of privatisation that take place in the economy greatly affects
the efﬁciency of government and business; both are gaining importance and magnitude
when they are accompanied by the quality of the legal system.
Note that due to the fact that more developing countries are entering the sample,
ﬁnancial openness and a country’s human development, although signiﬁcant, are losing
some of their impact (from 0.0972 to 0.0749 and from 0.0729 to 0.0383, respectively),
while the signiﬁcance of inﬂation remains the same (–0.0004) regardless of the model’s
speciﬁcation. Finally, the impact of the lagged value of the dependent variable seems to
be increasing as countries are developing (from 0.7492 for low and lower-middle
countries to 0.8128 for all countries), emphasising the dynamic view of ﬁnancial
development.
5. Conclusions
Since the late 1980s, institutions have been implemented in unparalleled scale across the
developing world while ﬁnancial development became one of the main components of
economic growth. In this paper, we go beyond the identiﬁcation of the effects of an
overall institutional index and try to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the
ﬁnance-institutions link for 52 economies from 1985 to 2008, by asking which dimen-
sion of institutions (economic, political, social) matter vis-à-vis ﬁnancial development
and whether the effects of economic institutions differ when different aspects are used
(quality of government, intervention of government, integrity of the judiciary).
Our main ﬁnding from the regression analysis is a robust empirical relationship from
institutions (economic and political) to ﬁnancial development, a result consistent with
most empirical studies. We argue that economic institutions are of fundamental impor-
tance for banking sector development especially for developing countries, while political
institutions are statistically signiﬁcant in low and lower-middle income countries.
Especially for economic institutions, the dimension of the legal system seems to be the
main determinant for the development of the banking sector, and much more when it is
accompanied by less government intervention via privatisation or/and liberalisation of
the public sector and by a government commitment against bureaucracy and corruption.
As for human development, there is a consistent effect on the ﬁnancial development in
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all samples of countries, demonstrating the paramount importance of economic
development for the development of ﬁnancial markets.
Regarding the openness and ﬁnance link, we ﬁnd that openness in both the good
and ﬁnancial markets has a strong association with bank-based ﬁnance and that capital
inﬂows have a great and positive effect on ﬁnancial development regardless of the stage
of economic development. Finally, the inﬂation-ﬁnance correlation emerges indepen-
dently of the inclusion or exclusion of countries with different stages of economic
development.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that the government of these
developing economies should impose less restrictive regulatory policies on ﬁnancial
market activities in order to promote the development of their ﬁnancial systems. More-
over, there may be good news for policy makers in countries that are relatively closed,
since opening up their capital accounts may provide an effective stimulus to ﬁnancial
development. Overall, improving economic and institutional development, as well as
ﬁnancial openness, will encourage the development of ﬁnancial markets.
We highlight two extensions of our study. First, one could further extend the analy-
sis to investigate the effects of other structural reforms on ﬁnancial development, such
as the extent to which bank assets are controlled by private owners, the restrictions on
foreign bank entry, the presence and extent of subsidised credit schemes and the degree
of independence of the bank supervisory agency. Second, the direction of causality
between ﬁnancial sector development and the explanatory variables is an important issue
of further research.
Disclosure statement
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Notes
1. The ‘politics and ﬁnance’ view is linked to the theory of institutions, and more speciﬁcally
with the ‘settler mortality’ hypothesis. Countries in which extractive institutions were set up
by colonial powers to avoid large-scale permanent settlement have often continued to privi-
lege small elites. These post-colonial elites have continued to restrict suffrage in the political
system and have limited access to economic resources to those within their own group. In
such systems there are no incentives to put into place a legal system that protects individuals’
rights against the state, to protect property rights and create regulatory and supervisory institu-
tions – i.e. to create the institutional conditions for successful ﬁnancial development.
2. We generated two versions of this index: one is constructed by calculating the arithmetic
average of the normalised values of these three variables (Campos & Kinoshita, 2008), and
the second is constructed by using the method of principal component analysis. Since the two
indexes are almost identical, we run the regressions with the arithmetic average of the nor-
malised values. One main advantage of such a transformation is that it allows our reform ser-
ies to be measured over the same scale. Another advantage is that the reference point is the
maximum in-sample value that changes over time (that is, it is not bound from above and
does not refer to some idealised perfectly functioning market economy).
3. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
4. http://ciri.binghamton.edu
5. More information about the variables used in the regression analysis and the relative data-
bases can be found at the Data Appendix.
6. Our empirical approach uses System GMM based on the xtabond2 command developed by
David Roodman for use with STATA, which offers unique features including observation
weights, automatic Hansen testing, and the ability to ‘collapse’ instruments to limit instrument
proliferation.
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7. The countries of the sample are: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Jamaica, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua, New
Guinea, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Appendix. Data Appendix
Variable Deﬁnition Database
BSD Aggregate measure based on Ratio of
liquid liabilities to GDP (LL), Credit
issued to the private sector to GDP (PC)
and Ratio of the commercial bank assets
to the sum of commercial bank assets
and central bank assets (DBA)
World Bank World Development
Indicators database:Banking Sector
development http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
ECONOMIC The Economic Institutional Quality is a
composite index of GOV, LEGAL and
POL as described below.




GOV Government Quality Index (bureaucracy,
corruption, legislative capacity and
accountability of the government) in
order to approach the Acemoglu et al.
(2001) hypothesis (higher values indicate
higher quality of government)






LEGAL Legal Structure and Security of Property
Rights Index (independence of the
judiciary, impartiality of the courts,
protection of property rights and legal
application of contracts) in order to
proxy the La Porta et al. (1997; 1998)
hypothesis (the index ranges from 0–10
where 0 corresponds to ‘less economic
freedom’ and 10 to ‘more economic
freedom’)






POL Size of Government Enterprises and
Investment Index (size of government
enterprises, subsidies, transfers and
expenditures) in order to proxy the
Girma and Shortland hypothesis
(countries with more government
enterprises and government investment
received lower ratings)







REGIME The Political Institutional Quality is
proxied by the Regime Durability (the









The Social Institutional Quality is
proxied by Workers‟ Rights Index
(measures the extent to which workers’
rights at work are internationally
recognised, including a prohibition on
the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labour; a minimum age for
the employment of children; and
acceptable conditions of work with
respect to minimum wages, hours of










work, and occupational safety and
health)
FO Ratio of accumulating holdings of assets
and liabilities of portfolio equity,
ﬁnancial derivatives, foreign direct
investment and debt to GDP
External Wealth of Nations Mark II




TO Ratio of exports and imports to GDP World Bank World Development
Indicators database:Trade openness
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator




HDI Composite index in three basic
dimensions of human development: a
long and healthy life, as measured by
life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as
measured by the adult literacy rate and
the combined gross enrolment ratio for
primary, secondary and tertiary schools;
and a decent standard of living, as
measured by GDP per capita





Low- and lower-middle income countries
Variable Observations Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
FD 897 0.333 0.108 0.034 0.677
ECON 897 0.209 0.097 0.027 0.473
LEGAL 897 0.433 0.113 0.160 0.742
GOV 897 0.460 0.130 0.091 0.769
POL 897 0.634 0.143 0.195 0.993
REGIME 897 14.807 14.923 0 59
WORKERS 897 0.802 0.675 0 2
FO 897 1.093 0.536 0.171 3.785
TO 897 0.937 0.442 0.145 3.902
INFL 897 0.702 9.448 −0.114 244.110
HDI 897 0.575 0.135 0.219 0.817
All developing countries
FD 1,196 0.346 0.108 0.034 0.677
ECON 1,196 0.236 0.110 0.027 0.586
LEGAL 1,196 0.460 0.119 0.143 0.742
GOV 1,196 0.489 0.140 0.091 0.864
POL 1,196 0.637 0.138 0.195 0.993
REGIME 1,196 16.612 17.102 0 88
WORKERS 1,196 0.883 0.687 0 2
FO 1,196 1.188 0.771 0.171 10.330
TO 1,196 0.909 0.431 0.144 3.902
INFL 1,196 0.724 8.356 −0.117 244.110
HDI 1,196 0.629 0.148 0.219 0.893
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